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Abstract—We propose P4-MACsec to protect network links be-
tween P4 switches through automated deployment of MACsec, a
widespread IEEE standard for securing Layer 2 infrastructures.
It is supported by switches and routers from major manufactur-
ers and has only little performance limitations compared to VPN
technologies such as IPsec. P4-MACsec introduces a data plane
implementation of MACsec including AES-GCM encryption and
decryption directly on P4 switches. P4-MACsec features a two-
tier control plane structure where local controllers running on
the P4 switches interact with a central controller. We propose a
novel secure link discovery mechanism that leverages protected
LLDP frames and the two-tier control plane structure for secure
and efficient management of a global link map. Automated
deployment of MACsec creates secure channel, generates keying
material, and configures the P4 switches for each detected link
between two P4 switches. It detects link changes and performs
rekeying to provide a secure, configuration-free operation of
MACsec. In this paper, we review the technological background
of P4-MACsec and explain its architecture. To demonstrate the
feasibility of P4-MACsec, we implement it on the BMv2 P4
software switch and validate the prototype through experiments.
We evaluate its performance through experiments that focus on
TCP throughput and round-trip time. We publish the prototype
and experiment setups on Github.
I. INTRODUCTION
MACsec is a widespread IEEE standard that protects the
Layer 2 with cryptographic integrity checks or symmetric en-
cryption. MACsec prevents man-in-the-middle attackers from
inspecting, inserting or even modifying network packets that
are transmitted between two network peers. In contrast to
VPN technologies such as IPsec, MACsec processing is im-
plemented on forwarding chips without notable overhead in
line rate performance [1]. Packets are protected in a point-
to-point manner between MACsec peers so that control plane
functions targeting higher layers can be still applied. Although
mechanisms for distributed key exchange exist, MACsec de-
ployment is still time-consuming and complex. It requires
knowledge about the network topology, large efforts in switch
configuration, and typically maintenance of a key server. Cur-
rently, automated deployments using a network management
system with legacy switches is not feasible. Legacy network
switches only support the Link Layer Discovery Protocol
(LLDP) that lacks in detecting topology changes in a timely
manner. In addition, it is vulnerable to several attacks that
may result in a incorrect topology view. Also, current legacy
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network switches do not support an automated configuration
of MACsec through a southbound protocol. Although a MIB
for manipulating MACsec configuration with SNMP exists
[2], only basic MACsec parameters can be modified so that
distributed protocols and a key server would be still required.
Software-defined networking (SDN) splits the strong bind-
ing between data and control plane. OpenFlow (OF) [3] is
the most widespread standard for SDN. It consists of SDN
switches with a fixed-function data plane that are steered by
a central SDN controller. P4 [4] is a novel domain-specific
language that introduces programmability to the data plane
of P4-capable packet forwarding devices such as ASICs,
CPU-based targets, and FPGAs. Data plane behaviour can
be described in P4 programs that run on P4 switches so
that network operators can constantly program the packet
processing on deployed switches. The P4 Runtime [5] extends
P4 switches by an API to an SDN controller similar to OF.
In this paper, we consider MACsec to dynamically protect
links between switches in SDN. We propose to utilize an
SDN controller for automated deployment of MACsec on SDN
switches instead of relying on distributed protocols. The SDN
controller continuously monitors the topology of the network
and sets up MACsec for detected links. SDN switches im-
plement the header structures and functionalities of MACsec,
including encryption and decryption using AES-GCM. OF
only supports control plane programmability, i.e., MACsec
data plane functionality cannot be implemented on the SDN
switches. Therefore, we propose a concept for MACsec in P4-
based SDN and call it P4-MACsec. P4 switches implement
packet switching based on MAC addresses and MACsec,
i.e., MACsec encryption, decryption, and integrity checks of
packets. For efficiency reasons, P4 switches are steered by a
two-tier control plane. Each P4 switch runs a local controller
that connects to a central controller. Functions of the control
plane may be solely part of the local controller or part of both
tiers. The control plane implements MAC address learning for
packet switching, a novel process for secure link discovery
with encrypted LLDP packets, and automated deployment of
MACsec. To demonstrate the feasibility of P4-MACsec, we
provide a prototype based on the BMv2 P4 software switch
[6]. We perform a functional validation of P4-MACsec in
a Mininet testbed through experiments and investigate on
TCP throughput and round-trip time (RTT) by conducting a
performance evaluation. We publish the source code of the
prototype and all experiments on Github [7]. In addition, we
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report on experiences in implementing P4-MACsec for the
NetFPGA SUME [8] platform.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we review technical background and related work
for IEEE 802.1AE (MACsec). Section III discusses technical
background and related work on link discovery in SDN. In
Section IV, we give an overview on P4. Section V describes
the architecture of P4-MACsec. In Section VI, we describe the
prototypical implementation of P4-MACsec with Mininet that
is validated in Section VII. In Section VIII, we present a per-
formance evaluation of the Mininet prototype. In Section IX,
we report on experiences in implementing P4-MACsec on the
NetFPGA SUME platform. Section X concludes this work.
II. MACSEC: FOUNDATIONS AND RELATED WORK
We give an overview of IEEE 802.1AE (MACsec) and
explain how it protects the Ethernet layer. We describe mech-
anisms for configuration and key management and review
related work on the application of MACsec in SDN.
A. Overview of MACsec
IEEE 802.1AE [9] introduces the media access control
security (MACsec) protocol. It provides point-to-point secu-
rity between MACsec peers that are connected to the same
local area network (LAN). Examples are links between two
switches or routers, links between switches or routers and
hosts, and links between hosts. MACsec ensures the integrity,
confidentiality, and authenticity of Ethernet (IEEE 802) frames
through applying symmetric encryption and cryptographic
hash functions. In addition, it provides replay protection and a
key exchange protocol to ensure perfect forward secrecy, i.e.,
session keys are not affected by a compromised private key.
Figure 1 visualizes the principle and the core components
of MACsec. The network hosts A, B, and C are part of a
LAN. Each network host has a MAC security entity (SecY)
and a MAC security key agreement entity (KaY). The SecY
provides secure MAC services over an insecure MAC service,
i.e., it performs packet encryption and decryption. The KaY
discovers other KaYs in the LAN that participate in the same
connectivity association (CA). It ensures that all network
hosts are mutually authenticated and authorized. Afterwards,
it creates and maintains secure channels (SCs) between the
MACsec peers that are used by the SecY to transmit and re-
ceive network packets. SCs are sender-specific, unidirectional,
point-to-multipoint channels. Each SC holds multiple secure
associations (SAs) that have a secure association key (SAK)
used for encrypting, decrypting, and authenticating packets.
MACsec leverages cipher suites for packet encryption, de-
cryption, and authentication. The standard defines the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard in Galois/Counter mode (AES-
GCM) with a block length of 128 bit (AES-GCM-128) as
required cipher suite. If only packet authentication but no
encryption is configured, MACsec applies the Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC). Further specifications [10],
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Fig. 1: Secure communication between three stations in MACsec that are part
of a connectivity association (CA). The unidirectional secure channel (SC)
between the SecYs holds multiple security associations (SAs) each with an
security association key (SAK) for encryption and decryption.
[11] add GCM-AES-256, GCM-AES-XPN-128, and GCM-
AES-XPN-256, but other cipher suites that meet several re-
quirements defined in the standard may also be applied.
Figure 2 depicts the packet structure of MACsec. The Eth-
ernet source and destination addresses of the MACsec packet
are adopted from the original Ethernet packet. The secure data
field either contains the encrypted user data of the original
Ethernet packet or the user data in plaintext if only MACsec
packet authentication is configured. The integrity check value
(ICV) field holds the result of a cryptographic hash function
that is applied on the whole Ethernet packet (1) including all
header fields. The secure data and ICV is calculated by the
chosen cypher suite (2). The security tag (SecTAG) contains
MACsec information, e.g., the SC or SA identifier to choose
the corresponding SAK for packet encryption, decryption, or
authentication. SecYs store multiple SAs with SAKs for each
SC. When SAKs should be changed in rekeying, one SecY
uses a new SA and signals the usage within the SecTAG so
that the receiving SecY can also change to the new SA.
Secure dataSecTAG ICV
MAC src
(1)
MAC dst
MAC src MAC dst
User data
(2)
System identifier Port number SA number
SC identifier
SA identifier
Fig. 2: Packet structure of MACsec applied to an Ethernet packet. The MAC
source and destination addresses of the MACsec packet are adopted from the
original packet. The user data is transformed into a secure data block that
is followed by the ICV calculated over the whole packet (1). The SecTAG
includes among other things parameters to identify the SC and SA.
MACsec is supported by most managed access, distribution,
and core switches from major manufacturers. In addition, it is
part of the Linux kernel since version 4.6 [12] so that even
switch-to-host or host-to-host links can be protected.
B. MACsec Key Exchange Protocol
The 802.1AE standard does not define processes for key
management or establishment of CAs and SAs between KaYs
on MACsec peers. Therefore, network administrators are re-
quired to configure the CA affiliation and SAs with SAKs on
every MACsec peer. IEEE 802.1X-2010 [13] introduces the
MACsec Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) for automated peer
discovery and exchange of SA data. With MKA, the initial
CA affiliation and SA with SAK is derived from a connectivity
association key (CAK). CAKs are either defined as pre-shared
secret, derived from a master session key of an EAP process,
or distributed by a MKA key server. Switches are required to
implement additional functionalities to either exchange keying
information via EAP with an AAA server or with an MKA
key server. Therefore, additional configuration effort is still
required for each switch.
C. Comparison to VPNs
VPN technologies such as IPsec, OpenVPN, or WireGuard
operate on Layer 3 or above. MACsec operates on Layer
2 and therefore provides link security for any higher-layer
protocol. It applies point-to-point protection while VPNs aim
at end-to-end protection. On every switch, router, or host in
the network, MACsec packets are decrypted at the ingress
port so that control plane functions targeting Layer 2 to 7
can be still applied. Access control lists (ACL) that provide
filtering based on IP addresses are an example. Then, packets
are encrypted again at the egress port. MACsec is configured
per Ethernet link so that administrators do not need to define
additional policies for specific traffic to be encrypted. On
routers and switches, MACsec is implemented on the packet
forwarding chips, i.e., packet encryption and decryption is
performed in line rate. In contrast, VPN technologies mostly
encrypt and decrypt packets on ASICs that have limited
bandwidth capacity. According to [1], IPsec traffic typically
cannot exceed 40 Gb/s of bidirectional traffic while MACsec
encryption and decryption scales with line rate.
D. Application of MACsec in SDN
The authors of [14] adopt MACsec to secure communication
in vehicular networks between Linux-based electronic control
units (ECUs). An SDN controller is responsible for automated
setup of MACsec between ECUs to provide an end-to-end
protection for network traffic. However, MACsec deployment
is limited to the ECUs, i.e., MACsec deployment on SDN
switches that connect the ECUs is not considered. The authors
of [15] develop an intent-based multilayer orchestrator as
application that interfaces an SDN controller. It automatically
deploys protection technologies such as IPsec or MACsec on
legacy switches through different southbound protocols, e.g.,
OpenFlow, NETCONF, or RESTCONF. However, MACsec
deployment on SDN switches is not considered. The authors
of [16] propose to implement MACsec for SDN but do not
formulate any concrete approach. The authors of [17] discuss
implementation experiences and design challenges for WAN
overlays using SDN and propose MACsec as viable option
to implement link layer encryption. However, the presented
implementation is limited to OpenVPN. Automated configu-
ration of MACsec on SDN switches is proposed, but not part of
the presented implementation. The authors of [18] describe a
mechanism for MACsec key distribution of particular MACsec
flows to switches. MACsec flows are end-to-end SCs that
break up the point-to-point concept of the original standard.
They are realized by configuring MACsec keys only on both
end peers, but not on the peers in between. As prerequisite,
all MACsec peers are expected to forward MACsec packets if
no key for the received packet is found.
III. LINK DISCOVERY IN SDN: FOUNDATIONS AND
RELATED WORK
Automated deployment of MACsec by a SDN controller
requires a topology view that is maintained through topology
monitoring with link discovery between SDN switches. We
give an overview on link discovery in SDN and describe
the OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP). We review related
work on variants of the OFDP that are optimized regarding
security, efficiency, and applicability in hybrid SDN networks.
A. Topology Monitoring and Link Discovery in SDN
Topology monitoring in SDN maintains a network map on
the SDN controller that consists of SDN switches and links in
between. In contrast to legacy networks, topology monitoring
in SDN can be limited to link discovery. In OpenFlow (OF),
SDN switches establish a connection to a pre-configured
SDN controller during the start. The SDN controller receives
information about the SDN switch, e.g., a list of all physical
ports, within the OF handshake at connection setup. With
the P4 Runtime API, the SDN controller may connect to P4
switches during the start. In both cases, the SDN controller
already identified all SDN switches so that only links need to
be detected.
B. OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP)
The OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) was the first
de-facto standard for link discovery in SDN. It leverages the
Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [19], the most widely
used protocol for link detection in legacy networks. The Cisco
Discovery Protocol (CDP) [20] is a proprietary alternative but
less widely used. LLDP advertisements include information
about the identity of a host, its capabilities, and its current
status. LLDP protocol data units (PDUs) are periodically sent
as payload of Ethernet frames with a multicast receiver address
and the EtherType 0x88cc. Figure 3 depicts their structure. The
PDUs may contain various type-length value (TLV) blocks, the
standard defines three required TLV blocks. First, the Chassis
ID TLV identifies the sending host, e.g., by its MAC address.
Second, the Port ID TLV identifies the sender’s port, e.g., its
physical port number. Last, the Time-to-Live TLV defines the
time validity of the information. Optional TLV blocks, e.g.,
the system’s name defined by the administrator, and custom
TLVs may be used as well. Network hosts that implement
LLDP can receive, but not request LLDP information. Legacy
switches periodically send out LLDP packets on each active
port as described before. The packets are received, processed,
and dropped by neighbouring LLDP agents on switches. They
store the received information in the management information
bases (MIBs) that can be queried by SNMP.
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Fig. 3: Format of LLDP packet and LLDPDU.
The OFDP leverages LLDP as introduced before but dele-
gates all functionalities to the SDN controller. It uses packet-
out messages to send out created network packets over partic-
ular ports of a SDN switch and packet-in messages to receive
packets from the SDN switch that match specific criterias,
e.g., an LLDP EtherType. Figure 4 depicts the process of link
discovery with OFDP. First, the SDN controller learns about
the switch identity and its ports within the OF handshake (1).
Afterwards, it creates dedicated LLDP packets for all ports
of a switch that are sent out via packet-out messages (2).
For incoming LLDP packets, the OF switches are configured
to forward any LLDP packet as packet-in message to the
SDN controller (3). The packet-in message includes the LLDP
packet with the Chassis and Port ID of the sender along the
identity and the ingress port of the receiving SDN switch. By
repeating this process for each port on each switch, the SDN
controller performs link discovery.
SDN controller
Switch B
(2) Packet-out
LLDP (ChassisID=A, PortID = 1)
Switch A
(3) Packet-in (Port=3)
(1) OF Handshake (1) OF Handshake
Fig. 4: Link discovery in SDN with OFDP. The SDN controller learns about
the SDN switch within the OF handshake (1). Afterwards, it sends out an
LLDP packet on a particular port of an SDN switch via a packet-out message
(2). Another SDN switch that receives the LLDP packet forwards it back to
the SDN controller using a packet-in message (3).
C. Optimized Variants of OFDP
We review related work on optimized variants of OFDP that
can be subdivided into publications investigating the security
of OFDP, efficiency of OFDP, and applicability of OFDP in
hybrid networks.
1) Security of OFDP: The authors of [21], [22], [23],
and [24] show that OFDP is vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
Injected LLDP control messages may create fake links that
redirect traffic to the host of an attacker. The authors of
[23] show that OFDP is additionally vulnerable to controller
fingerprinting, switch fingerprinting, and LLDP flooding at-
tacks. The authors of [24] show that OFDP is vulnerable to
replay attacks of LLDP packets that result in incorrect link
information of the topology. As improvement, the authors of
[21] and [22] propose to add a message authentication code
(MAC) and a message identifier to each packet to provide
authentication, packet integrity, and to prevent replay attacks.
sOFTDP [25] encrypts LLDP packets to further prevent fin-
gerprinting attacks.
2) Efficiency of OFDP: The authors of [23] and [26] show
that OFDP results in too many packet-out messages as the
SDN controller has to create and send out one message for
every port on each SDN switch. As an improvement, the
authors of [27] propose to apply LLDP with Port IDs set
to zero. The SDN controller creates one LLDP packet for
every SDN switch that are configured to output the LLDP
packet on all ports. This process is repeated for all SDN
switches. Adjacent SDN switches are configured to forward
received LLDP packets to the SDN controller so that it learns
about the unidirectional link. The authors of [28] propose to
reduce the number of packet-out messages through rewriting
LLDP packets on the SDN switch. sOFTDP [25] introduces
several mechanisms to shift large parts of link discovery back
to the SDN switch. It adds liveliness detection mechanisms
for switch ports and memorizes topology information locally
on the SDN switch that asynchronously notifies the SDN
controller about specific events. The authors of [26] propose
the Tree Exploration Discovery Protocol. SDN controllers
create and send out specific frames flooded in the network
that explore its topology. However, all concepts that shift
functionality back to the SDN switches require extensive
functional changes on the fixed-function data plane of typical
SDN switches.
3) Applicability of OFDP in Hybrid Networks: Hybrid
networks consist of SDN and non-SDN switches. OFDP can be
only applied to detect links in networks that consist of SDN
switches. Legacy switches that may connect SDN switches
process and discard received LLDP packets. The Broadcast
Domain Discovery Protocol (BDDP) is a non-standardized
approach that is implemented by several SDN controllers [29]–
[31]. BDDP messages adapt the LLDP packet structure but use
a broadcast Ethernet address instead of a multicast Ethernet
address and the custom EtherType 0x8999. SDN switches are
programmed to forward received BDDP packets to the SDN
controller, just as with LLDP. Legacy switches flood the packet
through all ports because of the broadcast address. They relay
BDDP packets so that links will appear as single hops no
matter how many legacy devices are on the path between two
SDN switches. However, the authors of [32] show that the
usage of broadcast packets leads to inefficient and excessive
utilization of network resources. The authors propose a two-
phase process for topology detection. First, the SDN controller
performs link discovery using OFDP as described before.
Afterwards, it outputs BDDP packets on any active port for
which it does not detect a direct link to another SDN switch
via LLDP. This way, the SDN controller detects direct links
via LLDP and indirect links via BDDP.
IV. P4: FOUNDATIONS
We briefly overview P4 with its core components for pro-
gramming a P4 switch, describe the P4 Runtime, and present
examples for P4 software and hardware targets.
A. Overview
P4 is a domain-specific language for programmable data
planes of network switches. It offers high-level constructs
that are optimized for specifying the forwarding behaviour
of a switch. P4 was first published in 2014 [4]. Today, the
specification and development takes place in the non-profit
P4 Language Consortium [33] with over 110 members from
industry and academia. P416 [34] is the latest version of
the language specification, the source code of all related
components is available under a Apache license.
Figure 5 depicts P4’s core concept and components. P4
programs contain the whole forwarding behaviour of switch.
They are formulated for a particular P4 architecture describing
the programming model of a switch. P4 targets are software or
hardware switches that implement a specific P4 architecture.
Target-specific P4 compilers generate binary code from P4
programs that can be loaded on the P4 target.
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Fig. 5: Concept and core components of P416.
B. Core Components for Programming a P4 Switch
In the following, we briefly describe the core components
of the P4 programming language following the specification of
P416. All components are shown in Figure 5. First, P4 header
types describe the format of packet headers through an ordered
collection of base types. For example, an Ethernet header is
described by bit vectors for the MAC source address, the MAC
destination address, and the EtherType. Second, P4 parsers
are state machines that extract packet data through applying
predefined sequences where data is identified and extracted
based on P4 header types. For instance, the value of a parsed
EtherType field of a packet determines the following extraction
state which could be LLDP, MACsec, or IP. Third, P4 tables
are match-and-action structures mapping user-defined keys to
particular P4 actions that may manipulate packet data. Fourth,
P4 externs are functions provided by a P4 target that can be
used within P4 programs. P4 externs have a defined interface
with a set of methods that can be used in the P4 programm.
An example would be a function that calculates checksums
for given chunks of data. Last, the P4 deparser assembles the
headers back into a well-formed network packet that can be
sent out via an egress port of the switch.
C. P4 Runtime
The P4 Runtime framework provides an API for controlling
P4 targets. Its operation is visualized in Figure 5. The P4
Runtime features the manipulation of match-and-action tables
through the control plane. In addition, it provides a CPU
port for sending out and receiving packets similar to the
packet-in and packet-out mechanism known from OpenFlow.
P4 Runtime leverages gRPC [35] that is based on HTTP/2 and
protocol buffer [36] data structures. The connection between
P4 switches and the control plane can be secured through
TLS with optional client and server certificates for mutual
authentication.
D. P4 Software & Hardware Targets
The BMv2 [6] is the most widely-used P4 software switch
that features multiple P4 targets. Examples are a P4 switch
with the P4 Runtime API (simple_switch_grpc) or a P4
switch implementing the Protocol Independent Switch Ar-
chitecture (PISA). The NetFPGA-SUME [37] or the Net-
cope NFB-200G2QL [38] are P4 targets that are based on
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) platforms. Ethernet
switches featuring the Barefoot Tofino ASIC [39] are the most
widely-used P4 switches nowadays. The Barefoot Tofino ASIC
implements the PISA architecture and offers 12.8 Tb/s of
packet throughput in its latest version. It is part of Ethernet
and Whitebox switches that also feature a general-purpose
computing unit with a x86 CPU, RAM, and a SSD that runs
a Linux-based operating system. An example is the Edgecore
Wedge 100BF-32X [40] Whitebox switch.
V. P4-MACSEC
In this section, we describe P4-MACsec. We review its
architecture and outline the three functional parts, packet
switching with MAC address learning, secure link discovery,
and automated deployment of MACsec, in detail.
A. Overview
Figure 6 depicts the concept of P4-MACsec. It consists of
a LAN with P4 switches that are steered by an SDN control
plane. P4 switches connect network hosts and implement the
data plane functionality of the three functional parts. P4-
MACsec features a two-tier control plane structure. Each P4
switch runs a local controller that connects to a central con-
troller. The two-tier control plane structure allows functions
to be shifted to the local controller or split up into two parts,
one running on the local controller and one part running on
the central controller. This reduces traffic in the management
network, load on the central controller, and latency from
forwarding packets between the SDN switches and the SDN
controller. The concept of hierarchical SDN control is not
novel but part of several SDN control plane architectures
(e.g., [41]–[43]). All P4 targets are coupled with general-
purpose computing capacities that may run a local controller
on the same device. In contrast to OpenFlow or other SDN
architectures, the two-tier control plane structure therefore
does not introduce additional computing nodes that may imply
a further risk of failout. The authors of [44] provide an
overview on hierarchical and distributed SDN control planes
and discuss its specifics. Although we see many advantages
in the two-tier control plane architecture, P4-MACsec can be
implemented with a one-tier control plane structure featuring
a central SDN controller as well.
We design the three functional parts as follows. First, MAC
address learning for packet switching ensures that P4 switches
forward Ethernet packets to provide Layer 2 connectivity
for all network hosts. We implement it as MAC address
learning function (MLF) that is exclusively part of the local
controller and describe its details in Section V-B. Second,
secure link discovery detects and monitors the link topology
of the network using LLDP protocol data units (PDUs) that
are protected with AES-GCM. We implement it as two-tier
control plane function. It consists of link discovery functions
(LDFs) running on the local controllers that inform the link
discovery controller function (LDCF) running on the central
controller about their local link view. The LDCF composes the
global link map that is the basis for automated deployment
of MACsec. We describe the details of this functional part
in Section V-C. Third, automated deployment of MACsec
dynamically creates, sets up, and maintains SCs on all switch-
to-switch links from the global link map. We implement it
as two-tier control plane function with decentral MACsec
functions (MSF) that receive configuration from a MACsec
controller function (MSCF) running on the central controller.
We describe its details in Section V-D.
MSCFLDCF
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Fig. 6: P4-MACsec in LAN with P4 switches. The local controllers consist
of the MAC address learning function (MLF), link discovery function (LDF),
and MACsec function (MSF). They communicate with the central controller
that runs the link discovery controller function (LDCF), MACsec controller
function (MSCF), and the global link map.
B. Ethernet Packet Switching with MAC Address Learning
Although MAC address learning is a typical example for
a local switch function, it cannot be solely implemented on
the data plane of a P4 switch. Our proposed architecture
for that functional part consists of two components. First, a
MAC address learning function (MLF) that runs on the local
controller. Second, the data plane implementation for MAC
address learning with the MLF and packet switching.
Figure 7 visualizes the process with all interactions between
both components. When the P4 switch receives an Ethernet
packet, it first checks if the source and destination MAC
address of the Ethernet packet are already part of the MAC
address table. If the MAC address table has entries for both
(1a), the switch forwards the packet on the port specified for
the destination MAC address (1b). If the MAC table yields no
match for both addresses (2a), the switch forwards the Ethernet
packet to the MLF running on the local controller as packet-
in message (2b). The MLF first checks if the MAC source
address and the ingress port is already part of the MAC address
table. If not, the MLF updates the MAC address table (2c).
Afterwards, the MLF floods the Ethernet packet on all ports
except the ingress port where it received the packet through
the packet-out function (2d).
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Fig. 7: Process of forwarding Ethernet packets on the P4 processing pipeline.
In case of missing entries in the MAC table, the processing pipeline issues
MAC address learning that is performed by the MAC address learning function
(MLF) running on the local controller.
C. Secure Link Discovery
The functional part of secure link discovery consists of three
components. First, link discovery functions (LDFs) running on
local controllers that perform link detection and monitoring.
Second, the link discovery controller function (LDCF) running
on the central controller that composes the global link map
from local link information received from the LDFs. Third,
the data plane implementation for receiving and sending out
LLDP packets via packet-in and packet-out messages.
As novelty, we propose to create, encrypt, and decrypt
LLDPDUs on the LDF using AES-GCM with a common
encryption key. We additionally introduce sequence numbers
for LLDPDUs to defend them against replay attacks. Figure 8
visualizes our proposed format of LLDPDUs in comparison
to the original format of LLDP packets. As in legacy LLDP,
the MAC source address is set to the MAC address of the
P4 switch. The MAC destination address and the EtherType
are set to the LLDP defaults as introduced in Section III-B.
LLDPDUs consists of three TLVs. The Chassis ID TLV
contains the identity of the switch as defined by the network
administrator, the Port ID TLV contains the number of the
physical port, the End TLV marks the end of the LLDPDU.
The common encryption key is installed and frequently up-
dated by the LDCF on all LDFs. In addition, AES-GCM uses
a 12 byte random number as nonce that is re-generated for
each LLDPDU leaving a particular port. It is part of the packet
header following the EtherType. The 4 Byte sequence number
as protection against replay attacks is initialized with the LDF
bootup timestamp and incremented with each packet sent out.
The receiving LDF holds a sequence number counter for every
physical port that is incremented with any received packet.
The sequence number is part of the packet authentication of
AES-GCM that is applied to the sequence number and on the
LLDPDU. Its result, the authentication tag, is stored within the
ICV field following the encrypted LLDPDU. Our approach
is similar to [25] and protects against all attacks that were
discussed in Section III-C.
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Fig. 8: Proposed format for encrypting LLDPDUs with AES-GCM. The
EtherType from the original packet is followed by a Nonce that is used in
AES-GCM encryption and decryption. A sequence number protects against
replay attacks, a ICV holds a cryptographic checksum for authentication.
Figure 9 visualizes the process of secure link discovery with
all interactions between the three components. At startup, the
LDF initiates a connection to the LDCF through a preconfig-
ured IP address or FQDN (1). The LDCF installs the common
key that is used for encrypting and decrypting LLDP packets
with AES-GCM and instructs the LDF to start secure link
discovery (2). The LDF generates and transmits encrypted
LLDP packets for all active port via packet-out messages to
the P4 switch (3a) which then outputs the received packets
on the specified ports (3b). As all other P4 switches received
the same instruction to start link discovery, the P4 switch now
receives encrypted LLDP packets from other P4 switches (4a)
that it sends as packet-in messages to the LDF (4b). It performs
decryption and extracts the Chassis and Port ID of the distant
switch from the LLDPDU along the physical port number
of the packet-in message to update the map of local links
(5). Finally, all changes of the local link map are sent to the
global link map on the central controller (6). The global link
map consists of bidrectional link in the form of two tuples
that indicate the identity of the P4 switch and the physical
port of the link as (SwitchA,PortA)→ (SwitchB,PortB). Link
topology can alter at any time, e.g., when links between
switches are added or when cables break. Therefore, link
discovery is executed whenever the LDF running on the local
controller receives status messages from its assigned switches,
e.g., due to a port-down notification when a cable breaks. Link
discovery is additionally performed after a fixed time interval
of 30 seconds so that security can be sustained even if status
messages from the P4 switches get lost.
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Fig. 9: Process of secure link discovery using the local link discovery functions
(LDF), the link discovery controller function (LDCF), and the processing
pipeline on the P4 switch.
In comparison to other approaches presented in Sec-
tion III-C, our proposal does not require modifications of the
SDN switches. All required mechanisms are implemented as
control plane functions that rely on packet-in and packet-out
mechanisms as offered by the CPU port in P4 or the packet-in
and packet-out messages of OpenFlow.
D. Automated Deployment of MACsec
Automated deployment of MACsec consists of three parts.
First, a MACsec controller function (MSCF) that creates two
unidirectional SCs for each link of the global link map.
Second, a MACsec function (MSF) that runs on the local
controller. It receives configuration data from the MSCF and
sets up the SCs on the P4 switch. Third, the data plane
implementation of MACsec that consists of the P4 processing
pipeline and implementations of the MACsec validate and
protect functions that can be used as P4 externs.
Figure 10 visualizes the automated deployment of MACsec
with all interactions between the three components. We later
describe the details of the MACsec validate and protect func-
tion. The P4 processing pipeline is an extension of the Ethernet
packet forwarding pipeline that was introduced in Section V-B.
At start, the MSCF creates and maintains MACsec secure
channels (SCs) based on the global link map (a). It passes
SC configuration data to the MSF (b) which updates various
P4 tables in the processing pipeline (c). For the P4 processing
pipeline, it sets a MACsec flag to entries of the MAC address
table if a SC for that particular link exists. Then, the data plane
processing for packets works as follows. First, ingress packets
are matched in an EtherType table (1). Ethernet packets match-
ing the MACsec EtherType are forwarded to the MACsec
validate function (2a). It validates its authenticity, optionally
decrypts the secure data, and returns an Ethernet packet.
Afterwards, the processing pipeline continues with Ethernet
packet forwarding, i.e., it consults the MAC address table (2b),
outputs the packet in case of a match for both source and
destination MAC address (2c), or sends the packet as packet-
in message to the MLF on the local controller otherwise (2d).
Ethernet packets matching other EtherTypes are forwarded to
the MAC address table (3a). If the MAC address table holds no
flag for an SC for the particular destination MAC address, the
packets are either sent out (3b) or passed to the MLF (3c) as
explained in Section V-B. If the MAC table yields a match for
both MAC addresses of the packet and an SC flag, it forwards
the packet to the MACsec protect function (3d). The MACsec
protect function responds with a MACsec packet that can be
sent out (3e) via the egress of the processing pipeline.
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Fig. 10: Process of automated MACsec deployment with the MACsec function
(MSF), MACsec controller function (MSCF, and the processing pipeline of
the P4 switch.)
Figure 11 visualizes the MACsec protect and validate func-
tion. As SCs are unidirectional, the P4 switch has a ingress
MACsec SC (IG-SC) table and a egress MACsec SC (EG-SC)
table that maps secure channel identifiers (SCIs) to security
associations (SAs). SAKs are part of the SA table that holds
SAs for both, ingress and egress SCs. The MACsec protect
function (1) either encrypts or authenticates Ethernet payloads.
It is applied to Ethernet packets if the MAC address table in
the Ethernet packet forwarding pipeline has a flag set for the
particular physical port. Within the protect function, an egress
secure channel (EG-SC) table maps the egress port number
as SCI to security association identifiers (SAIs). The SA table
holds the security association keys (SAK) to be used for the
protect function. The MACsec protect function receives the
SAK and SCI from the SA table, the packet number from a
packet counter as part of the switch, and the Ethernet packet.
The AES-GCM cipher is initialized with a concatenation of
the SCI and packet number as initialization vector. Afterwards,
the EtherType and the payload are concatenated and encrypted.
The MACsec protect function creates a new Ethernet packet
with the MAC source and MAC destination address of the Eth-
ernet packet, the MACsec EtherType, the SecTAG, the secure
data, and the ICV. The MACsec validate function (2) works
in a similar manner. Again, an ingress secure channel (IG-
SC) table maps SCIs to SAIs. The MACsec validate function
receives the SAK and SCI from the IG-SC and SA table, the
packet number from a packet counter, and the MACsec packet.
It then checks the integrity and optionally decrypts the packet.
It returns an Ethernet packet with the original Ethernet header
and payload to the processing pipeline where forwarding and
MAC address learning occurs as described before.
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Fig. 11: MACsec protect (1) and MACsec validate (2) functions implemented
as P4 externs within the P4 processing pipeline.
The MSCF creates and maintains MACsec SCs whenever
the global link map changes. SCs exist until the corresponding
link is deleted, e.g., in case of a link failure, the corresponding
SC with all its SAs is deleted. If a new link is detected,
the MSCF creates a new MACsec SC with SAs. In addition,
MACsec SCs and SAs are renewed on a regular basis. Ad-
ministrators define timeouts for encryption keys, the MSCF
generates and installs new SAs on the P4 switches after the
defined time interval through the MSF. Whenever SCs are
created, changed, or deleted, configuration data and SAs are
passed to the MSF that programs the P4 switch through writing
in the EG-SC, IG-SC, and SA table.
VI. PROTOTYPICAL IMPLEMENTATION WITH MININET
In the following, we describe a prototypical implementation
of P4-MACsec. We review the Mininet testbed environment
and describe the three components of P4-MACsec in detail.
A. Testbed Environment
We use the Mininet [45] network emulator to build the
testbed environment for the prototypical implementation. We
leverage the BMv2 P4 software switch [46] for implementing
the P4 switch and run the local controllers and the central
controller as Python applications. For testing purposes, we
additionally run Mininet network hosts that are connected to
the P4 switches. All testbed components are executed within a
KVM/QEMU virtual machine (VM) that runs Ubuntu 16.04.
with 4 CPU cores and 4GB RAM. The hypervisor host features
an Intel Core i5 8250U CPU, 16GB RAM, and an SSD.
B. P4 Switch
We extend the simple_switch_grpc [47] P4 target of the
BMv2 P4 software switch [46] to later run our P4 program
that describes the data plane functions. Figure 12 depicts its
parts. First, we implement the MACsec protect and validate
functions as P4 externs within the simple_switch_grpc P4
target. We program the extensions in C++ and leverage the
envelope (EVP) interface of OpenSSL [48] to apply AES-
GCM for encryption, decryption, and packet authentication.
Both functions can be used as P4 externs within the P4
processing pipeline. When accessing the functions from the P4
processing pipeline, packet header data is exchanged using P4
attributes where packet payload data can be accessed directly.
Second, we implement an interface to the local controller. It
leverages the P4 runtime API via gRPC and allows the local
controller to modify entries of the P4 tables in the processing
pipeline. In addition, it holds the CPU port interface that
provides packet-in and packet-out messages as known from
OpenFlow. Packets sent from the P4 pipeline to the CPU port
are forwarded to the local controller, packets received from
the CPU port are injected into the P4 processing pipeline. The
data plane functions of P4-MACsec described as P4 processing
pipeline in Section V are implemented as P4_16 program using
known P4 constructs as introduced in Section IV. The P4
program then is executed on the modified simple_switch_grpc
P4 target as P4 switch.
C. Local Controller
We implement the local controller as Python 2.7 application.
Figure 12 depicts its parts. We leverage the gRPC library [49]
to program the interfaces to the associated P4 switch and to
the central controller. We use the Scapy library [50] to create
and parse LLDP packets and the cryptography library [51] for
applying AES-GCM to encrypt and decrypt LLDP packets. For
development and testing purposes, the local controller features
a simple CLI. It allows to write and read table entries and to
display status changes on the P4 switch.
D. Central Controller
We implement the central controller similar to the local
controller as Python 2.7 application. Figure 12 depicts its
parts. It also leverages the gRPC library [49] to build an gRPC
interface to the local controller. It also features a simple CLI
for development and testing purposes that displays information
about the current topology and active MACsec secure channels
(SCs). The control plane functions of P4-MACsec can also
be integrated in ONOS [31] or other controller frameworks.
However, our objectives was a lightweight prototype us-
ing a slim and easy-to-understand controller implementation
which directly leverages the P4 runtime and gRPC library
for communication. Thereby, we avoided dependencies on
other controller frameworks which increase error space and
implementation complexity.
VII. FUNCTIONAL VALIDATION
We describe the experiment setup and validation experi-
ments executed on the testbed from Section VI.
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Fig. 12: Structure of the prototypical implementation of MACsec. It consists
of a BMv2 P4 software switch that implements the data plane functions of
P4-MACsec and the two-tier control plane with the functions as introduced
in Section V.
A. Experiment I: Compliance to the MACsec Standard
We first perform an experiment to examine the compliance
of P4-MACsec to the IEEE 802.1AE standard. Therefore, we
set up a virtualized testbed that consists of a KVM virtual
machine running Ubuntu Server in Version 18.04.1 LTS and
our implementation of P4-MACsec on the BMv2 P4 software
switch as described in Section VI. The P4 switch connects
another Ubuntu Server 18.04.1 LTS KVM/QEMU virtual
machine that represents a network host behind a MACsec-
enabled switch. We configure a static MACsec connection
between a P4 switch and a Linux host to check whether the
MACsec implementation for BMv2 is compatible with the
Linux implementation of MACsec. On the Ubuntu server, we
set up the static MACsec connection using the iproute2 tools.
For MACsec setup on the P4 switch, we use a simple Python
script that adds the corresponding entries in the EG-SC, IG-
SC, and SA tables of the P4 processing pipeline. We success-
fuly validate that the Ubuntu server communicates with the
P4 switch via MACsec in different communication scenarios,
e.g., ICMP or streaming random data via TCP connections
with netcat. This does not validate a full compliance to all
parts of the MACsec standard but demonstrates, that the P4
switch can communicate via MACsec with legacy devices.
B. Experiment II: Complete P4-MACsec Scenario
We now investigate the complete set of functionality of P4-
MACsec. Therefore, we create the topology depicted in Fig-
ure 13. It follows the model of hierarchical network switches
that consists of core, aggregation, and access switches. A set
of 12 network hosts is split into four groups, each attached to
an access switch. The four access switches are connected to
two aggregation switches that are connected by a single core
switch. The testbed network is a single Layer 2 domain, i.e.,
network packets are forwarded based on their MAC address.
After starting the Mininet testbed, we verify the following
aspects. First, we examine that topology monitoring works
correctly. In initial link discovery, we verify that the detected
topology matches the actual network topology. Afterwards,
we sporadically remove and re-add links between switches
and supervise the process of link monitoring on the central
controller via a CLI. Second, we examine that automated
deployment of MACsec and rekeying works correctly. We
investigate MACsec setup after changes in link monitoring
through supervising the EG-SC, IG-SC, and SA tables on all
P4-MACsec switches. Last, we examine packet switching and
correct setup of MACsec protection. Therefore, we use ICMP
and netcat to create network traffic between various pairs
of network hosts in the experiment scenario. We investigate
packet traces on links between switches and verify that all
packets are protected by MACsec.
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Fig. 13: Virtual testbed environment that consists of network hosts, access
switches, distribution switches, and a core switch. Each P4 switch is steered
by a local controller (LoCo) that connects to the central controller.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We describe the evaluation setup and experiments for per-
formance evaluation executed on the testbed from Section VI.
A. Evaluation Setup
Figure 14 depicts the evaluation setup. It consists of two
network hosts that are attached to two P4 switches with 0 to 6
P4 switches in between. We perform performance evaluation
experiments to investigate the throughput and round-trip time
(RTT). We vary the number of P4 switches between the two
network hosts and measure throughput and RTT for 1 to
8 hops. For each evaluation experiment, we consider three
scenarios. In the first scenario, MACsec is disabled, i.e., the
P4 switches between Host 1 and Host 2 only perform MAC
address learning and L2 forwarding. In the second scenario,
we enable MACsec so that all packets between Host 1 and
Host 2 are protected with AES-GCM implemented as P4
Extern. In the third scenario, we enable MACsec but skip
AES-GCM encryption and decryption in the P4 extern so that
only cleartext payloads are sent within the MACsec packets.
This third scenario is not part of the MACsec standard but a
modification for the performance evaluation that allows us to
measure the impact of AES-GCM in comparison to the impact
of exchanging network packets with an P4 extern.
B. TCP Throughput
We first investigate on the TCP throughput in P4-MACsec.
Therefore, we measure TCP transmissions between Host 1
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Fig. 14: Evaluation testbed that consists of two network hosts that are attached
to two P4 switches. In between, we vary from 0 to 6 additional P4 switches
to form variable-length P4 switch chains for the evaluation experiments.
and Host 2 with iperf3 [52]. Host 1 runs an iperf server,
Host 2 runs an iperf client. We perform three runs, each
with a duration of 30 seconds. Figure 15 depicts the results
calculated as average over the three runs. As expected, the
throughput for all scenarios decreases with the number of P4
switches that run on the testbed. Enabled MACsec processing
causes a large degradation in throughput. However, applying
or omitting AES-GCM in the P4 extern does not cause large
differences in throughput. The large decrease in throughput is
not the result of encryption or decryption with AES-GCM but
an effect of the interaction between the P4 pipeline and the
MACsec protect and MACsec validate P4 externs in BMv2.
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Fig. 15: TCP throughput evaluation with 1 to 8 hops represented by P4
switches between two network hosts with iperf3. We consider three scenarios:
disabled MACsec, enabled MACsec with encryption and decryption using
AES-GCM, and enabled MACsec without encryption and decryption.
C. Round-Trip Time (RTT)
In the second experiment, we investigate the round-trip time
(RTT) between the two network hosts that are connected by
1 to 8 P4 switches in between. We use the ping [53] tool on
Host 1 to send 1000 consecutive ICMP echo requests to Host
2. We set an idle period of 0.01 seconds between two ICMP
packets and perform three runs of the experiment. Figure 16
depicts the RTTs calculated as average over the three runs.
The evaluation results are similar to those of the experiment
on TCP throughput. Enabled MACsec causes an increase of
the RTT. Again, applying or omitting AES-GCM in the P4
extern does not cause large differences in the RTT. As in the
experiment on TCP throughput, the interaction between the
P4 pipeline and the MACsec protect and MACsec validate P4
externs in BMv2 seems to cause the negative effects on the
RTT.
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Fig. 16: Round-trip time (RTT) evaluation with 1 to 8 hops represented by
the P4 switches between two network hosts with ping. We consider three
scenarios: disabled MACsec, enabled MACsec with encryption and decryption
using AES-GCM, and enabled MACsec without encryption and decryption.
D. MACsec Setup Time
As described in Section V, the two-tier control plane auto-
matically configures and enables MACsec on all assigned P4
switches. As described in Section II-B, MACsec deployments
require configuration effort whether static key setup on all
switches or MKA is applied. With P4-MACsec, that config-
uration effort to deploy MACsec completely disappears. The
process of link discovery, MACsec setup, and the periodically
reiterations are performed within nearly not measureable time
intervals. The two-tier control plane performs all actions
sequentially, i.e., delays might turn up with a very large
number of controlled P4 switches.
IX. IMPLEMENTATION ON NETFPGA SUME
In the following, we briefly describe the NetFPGA SUME
[8] platform and outline our experiences in implementing P4-
MACsec for that platform.
A. NetFPGA SUME Platform
The NetFPGA SUME board is a platform for rapid proto-
typing of network applications with bandwidths up to 10 Gb/s.
It features a Virtex-7 690T field-programmable gate array
(FPGA), four SFP+ network transceivers, and an PCI Express
interface to the host system [37]. The P4-NetFPGA project
[54] transforms the NetFPGA SUME board into a hardware P4
switch. P4 programs are transformed into SDNet descriptions
by the P4-SDNet compiler that creates HDL modules that run
as part of the reference architecture of the NetFPGA SUME
board.
B. Implementation of P4-MACsec
We modify the P4 processing pipeline of our software proto-
type to cope with limitations of the architecture, e.g., a missing
lookahead function in packet parsing or the limitation to a
single instead of multiple control blocks in the P4 processing
pipeline. We implemented AES-GCM based on a publicly
available Verilog module from OpenCores [55]. However, we
were not able to create a fully working P4-MACsec switch
due to two severe limitations. First, the NetFPGA SUME
platform does not provide functions to parse or access variable-
length payloads of network packets. Therefore, payloads of
network packets need to be parsed as headers, which limits
the implementation to fixed-length packets. Last, exchange of
packet data between the P4 processing pipeline and the P4
external function is limited. Currently, data that is transferred
from the P4 processing pipeline to a P4 external function
needs to be transmitted within one clock cycle of the FPGA.
Due to timing limitations, it is only possible to transmit very
small amounts of data. The developers from the P4-NetFPGA
project confirmed that the current version does not allow
to process complete network packets within P4 externs. We
were able to increase the amount of data to be exchangeable
by reducing the base clock frequency of the NetFPGA to
128 bytes. However, this is still far away from real-world
applicability. A packet streaming function through P4 external
functions was announced, but is not available so far. Summing
up, both limitations did not allow us to build a prototype that is
suitable for real-world scenarios with variable-length packets
exceeding a total length of 128 bytes.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work we proposed P4-MACsec, a concept to auto-
matically protect links between switches with MACsec in P4-
SDN. Our concept features a P4 data plane implementation
for MACsec including encryption and decryption using AES-
GCM. P4 switches are steered by a novel two-tier control plane
that consists of local controllers running on all P4 switches
that connect to a central controller. We presented a novel
mechanism for link discovery using encrypted LLDP packets
and automated deployment of MACsec link protection. We
presented the architecture of P4-MACsec and demonstrated
its feasability in a prototypical implementation for the BMv2
P4 software switch. We used that prototype to experimen-
tally validate P4-MACsec in a virtualized testbed built with
Mininet and performed evaluation experiments. We discussed
experiences with implementing P4-MACsec for the NetFPGA
SUME platform. We discovered that both P4 targets have ma-
jor constraints regarding the implementation of P4-MACsec.
Using the P4 externs for MACsec on the NetFPGA SUME
platform was not feasible at all. Only fixed-lenght packets that
do not exceed a total size of 128 bytes can be exchanged.
Using the P4 externs for MACsec on the BMv2 P4 target
results in large degradations in TCP througput and latency in
RTTs. However, use-cases that aim at securing the network
by applying authentication, encryption, and integrity checks
are important. P4-MACsec completely eliminates previous
configuration efforts for MACsec as network security mech-
anism. Similar approaches for traffic protection on different
layers, e.g., L3 or L4 VPN, are imaginable. Therefore, P4
switches should offer native functional blocks for encryption
and decryption and overhead-free interfaces to P4 externs.
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